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The Community Context
The 'problem' of world hunger has recently received
considerable attention within the European Com-
munity in reports and debates of the European
Parliament [1980,19821. The EC Commission [1981,
19821 and the Council of Ministers (1981) have in turn
responded in a policy context. The subject is so vast
that inevitably there is a need to identify priority areas
for discussion. One such area of concern is potential
European response to the acute short term problems
of economic adjustment being faced by low income
countries. Mr Pisani has also accorded priority to
providing food security in the context of effective
strategies for rural development [EC Commision
1982]. There are considerable overlaps between these
areas of concern, and recent experiences and policy
analysis have tended to underscore the significant
policy implications of recognising linkages between
the discussions. A necessary starting point for policy
discussion is a clearer understanding of the
complexities of the problems of hunger and poverty to
which national and international policies are
addressed.
Characteristics of the 'Hunger Problem'
What are the problems of hunger and poverty? There
is not so much a single problem of world hunger as
related sets of problems which have different
implications for policy at national and international
levels. Different elements of EC trade and aid policies
have an impact on particular aspects of these
problems. The complexity of these questions is
indicated if one focuses only on the problem of food
insecurity - risks to the target levels of food
consumption of households, communities and nations.
It is important to distinguish between the different
problems of food insecurity and their quite different
policy implications. This is not always easy, since
interventions to combat these problems are necessarily
institutionalised in different policy contexts [Clay and
others 1981; Clay 1982]. Broadly, three categories of
food insecurity problems can be recognised: short
term emergencies; short term regional or national
food insecurity; and international food insecurity
resulting from instability of world food markets.
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Short term emergencies These occur where groups or
regions are confronted with short term threats to food
consumption. They raise a range of policy problems
depending on the circumstances, scale, and expected
duration of the threat. This article does not give
attention to emergencies, but it should be noticed in
passing that the complexities of the problem are
compounded by the many international parties
involved. From the viewpoint of the major develop-
ment assistance agencies, there is an inherent dilemma
involved in the recognition of, and response to,
emergencies. There are powerful political pressures to
become involved. But all too often, the nature of the
emergency and the lags in information, as well as the
decision processes of agencies, preclude significant
responses before the initial emergency phase has
passed.
Short term regional or national food insecurity The
macro aspect of such problems, reflected in pressure
on aggregate food consumption, has made this a
primary area of concern in national and international
discussions of food security. The actual problems of
food insecurity are, however, characteristically
sectoral and regional, affecting particular groups
within societies. A profile of the longer term problems
of poverty, malnutrition and hunger which involve
periodic and seasonal pressures on food consumption
will indicate the vulnerable groups. Food insecurity is
likely to have distinctive rural and urban as well as
regional dimensions. Women and small children are
more likely to be severely affected. Particular
occupational groups such as agricultural labour and
plantation workers are often more vulnerable. As
attention shifts to these longer term problems and to
the groups who are most vulnerable, a link is
underscored between food security, poverty and
agricultural and rural development. Recognition of
this linkage has fostered an interest in articulating
policies which simultaneously respond to short term
problems of food insecurity and longer term problems
of agricultural development at the individual country
level. These are the so-called 'food strategies'
discussed below.
1See Clay and Pryer [1982:7- 12], Table 2, for a typology of emergencies
and the institutional responses involved in these problems.
13
International food insecurity The food crisis of the
early 1970s underscored the vulnerability of low
income countries to short term fluctuations in world
cereal markets. The rapid increase in costs of food
imports coinciding with the rapid increase in energy
prices created severe short run adjustment problems
for many low income countries. These events focused
attention on world grain markets in which the EC has
come to be a significant force both as an exporting and
as an importing trade group. However, as subsequent
events have demonstrated, it is misleading to focus
solely on fluctuations in cereal markets as the source
of food insecurity created by short run adjustment
problems. More important is the fact that many more
developing countries have become vulnerable to
movements in the world economy because of
structural changes in their agricultural and food
sectors. There are very significant agricultural and
food security dimensions to the recently experienced
problems of short run adjustment. There are several
dimensions to this. First, the growing dependence of
middle income and low income countries on imported
food (not only cereals, but also sugar, vegetable oils,
dairy products, etc) has increased the short run
problem of food insecurity. Second, there is a growing
dependence of domestic agriculture in developing
countries on imported inputs: fertilisers, pesticides,
fuel for machinery, processing and trucking. These
problems are of long standing in export-oriented
economies, for example sugar producers. The growing
food import dependence is linked to rapid expansion
of urban markets and income growth. As a
consequence, in the short run, more countries are
becoming vulnerable to domestic production instabi-
lity, fluctuations in the international markets for their
food imports as well as exports, and pressures on the
supply of intermediate inputs, particularly fossil
energy.
The seriousness of these problems as an aspect of short
run economic and adjustment difficulties is indicated
by current individual country experience, cg Tanzania
[Green 1982]. More widely, the United States
Department of Agriculture [1982] looking at the food
situation for the current year (1982/83) has estimated
that a large number of low income countries will be
faced with serious internal food supply problems and
balance of payments pressures that will make it
difficult to sustain food consumption at the levels of
the late 1970s unless there is, first, an increase in the
aggregate level of food transfers and, second,
additional concessional finance to sustain imports.
There is the simultaneous long run policy problem,
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, of falls in per capita
food production in still largely rural economies
[Christensen 1981]. It is a major policy challenge to
address these difficulties simultaneously; Michael
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Lipton discusses this issue more fully elsewhere in this
Bulletin.
The European Community's role
The effect of trade policies
Agricultural growth, stimulated by the CAP, has
made the European Community a major force in
world agricultural trade. The EC has become a
significant source of food on a commercial as well as a
concessional basis to many Third World countries.
The full extent of these developments, which have
been rapid, is not yet fully appreciated. For example,
even the United Kingdom which for two centuries was
a net importer of cereals, has a net exportable surplus
of some 2 mn tonnes during 1982/83. The EC is widely
known to provide skimmed milk powder (SMP) as
food aid (approximately 150,000 tonnes annually in
recent years). Commercial exports of SMP to the
Third World have also expanded dramatically. The
relative importance of commercial sales can be gauged
from the example of Mexico which in recent years has
imported a quantity equivalent to approximately half
the level of recent total annual allocations of food aid.
However, in contrast to the other 'traditional'
temperate zone agricultural exporters, the EC has
managed the development of exports to a significant
extent under short run policies for coping with
surpluses.
The influence of EC trade policies in many markets for
agricultural products is complex and controversial.
The effects of quota agreements for imports have to be
balanced against the policy, in a number of markets, of
exporting against restitutions (subsidies) with de-
stabilising implications for Third World exports and
imports. The most widely recognised example is
probably sugar. The EC has agreed quotas for imports
with ACP exporters, largely the traditional suppliers
to the UK market, at prices that have usually been
substantially above world market levels. However, the
EC also undercuts the world market for developing as
well as developed country producers by using
subsidised exports to manage internal surpluses.
Another recent example, indicative of the complex
implications of these policies, is provided by the
experience of Botswana as a beef exporter. On the one
hand, Botswana has a small quota of exports to the EC
with severe quality controls. But, on the other hand, it
faces competition from the EC in third markets:
during 1981/82 EC exports replaced Botswana
exports to Angola in contracts that were significantly
below those negotiated by the two African countries in
the previous year.2 In the foreseeable future,
expansion of the EC threatens to have negative
implications for, at the least, a subgroup of developing
countries around the Mediterranean as well as others
1Personal communication from Charles Harvey, June 1982.
with export possibilities for a comparable range of
products. As already noted, short run adjustments
created by fluctuations in export revenue can be just as
much a source of food insecurity as problems created
by import prices or domestic production.
In the context of the problems of food insecurity and
short run adjustment, the major questions concern the
role of the EC in trade and trade negotiations over
temperate cereals. EC trade policies during the early
1970s were a factor in shifting the burden of
adjustment to rising prices onto a residual group,
including developing countries.
Internal prices for EC-produced cereals and imports
(with duty) of grain, both for human consumption and
animal feed, are set well above long run world market
levels. Imports are therefore insensitive over a wide
range to movements in world market prices. These
policies stabilise direct human consumption and
production of animal products within the Community.
This provides European food security. However, the
external consequence of such policies, as followed by
the EC as well as other important food importing
countries including Japan, the USSR and Eastern
Europe, is that the burden of adjustment in world
markets falls particularly heavily on the United States
livestock sector and on developing countries. The
most vulnerable are countries whose capacity to
import is constrained by their foreign exchange
position.
The EC has subsequently played a constructive role in
cereal negotiations through its willingness to parti-
cipate in market stabilisation. However, its interest in
maintaining world prices at levels closer to historically
higher EC internal prices has obvious negative
implications for developing country food importers.
Negotiations on a new International Grains Agree-
ment are currently on ice given United States
opposition to the management of markets through the
use of buffer stocks over which there is some form of
international control. In the absence of internationally
agreed arrangements for cereal markets the EC
participates in the informal discussions amongst
cereal exporters. The shift from attempting to find a
formal institutional approach to market management
to seeking an informal exporter cartel nevertheless
makes it less likely that there will be a recurrence of the
disorderly markets of the early l970s, despite evidence
of growing tension between the EC and the United
States over export policies in currently softer market
conditions [Gilmore and Huddleston 1983].
There is also a complex set of international
institutional arrangements for the organisation of
food aid in cereals. The Food Aid Convention,
formally linked to the International Grains Agreement
but in practice separately negotiated, has set a floor
level of 7.6 mn tonnes for donor commitments up to
1986. The operation of this Convention is supervised
by a Food Aid Committee (FAC) of donors meeting
under the auspices of the International Wheat Council
[Parotte 1983]. There is also the UN Committee on
Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA) which sets
guidelines for food aid policies and supervises the
operations of the World Food Programme and
International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR),
involving both donors and recipient countries. There
are three other institutions with a role in these matters:
the World Food Council (WFC) concerned with
policy issues, the FAO Committee on Food Security,
and the FAO Committee on Surplus Disposal
involving exporting countries and responsible for
ensuring that food aid and other concessional
arrangements do not disrupt normal commercial
trade.
This complex of institutional arrangements covering
cereals trade and aid indicates why, in practice,
discussions of the role of the EC in relation to world
hunger have tended to be concerned only with the
development assistance programmes of the Com-
munity and constituent member states. There is a
problem of multiple objectives. The delinking and
compartmentalisation of issues makes it possible to
negotiate in a narrow framework, with other
objectives treated as effective constraints on the
discussion. For example, negotiation of the overall EC
cereals food aid commitment in the context of the
FAC takes as given the existing internal and trade
policies for cereals which are generating sizeable level
of surpluses in the medium term. Consequently, and
perhaps inevitably within the foreseeable future,
discussions of Europe's 'role' in combatting world
hunger have come to focus on the Community's
development assistance programme, the Lomé group
of countries, and linkages between different com-
ponents of Community assistance at the individual
country level. So far, internal Community political
considerations have been paramount in relation to the
wider trade issues. In addition, Europe is just one
party in a complex set of market relationships
dominated by a small number of exporting and
importing countries. The Community could become a
force for more constructive policies on the part of
developed countries as a whole, along such lines as
suggested by the Brandt Commission. However,
because existing trade arrangements imply a particular
distribution of gains and losses amongst developed
countries, including those who have not been
historically party to international agreements on
commodities - notably Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, it would be unrealistic to expect any
unilateral action on the part of the Community to
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liberalise trade policies where a significant share of the
gains would accrue to other developed countries.3
Lomé and Stabex
Within the more restricted context of EC development
assistance policy, there is scope for constructive
initiatives, for example over the operation of Stabex,
and the operation of Community food aid, including
the currently fashionable emphasis on linking
different components of development assistance to
supporting food strategies at the individual country
level.
The recent modification of the IMF Compensatory
Financing Facility (CFF) to take account of
fluctuations in the bill for cereal imports with an
accompanying small increase in the scale of possible
drawings by members, provides a possible model for
modification of the Stabex compensation scheme for
fluctuations in export earnings [Green and Kirkpatrick
1981, 19821. The linking of some genuine element of
additionality, however modest, to the modification of
the Stabex facility to accomodate food imports would
be a constructive step. From the viewpoint of eligible
countries, what is critical is the expected cost of
imports in relation to export revenues, not just the
level of export revenues. As the IMF CFF is typically
only sufficient to take account of a proportion of the
fluctuations in expected export revenues or import
costs, the move would be complementary, even if
restricted in application to a limited number of
countries. However, such a development may raise
questions of associated conditionality, since the level
and commodity composition of food imports is
determined by most of the Lomé country governments
in relations to the availability of concessional supplies
and other competing demands for foreign exchange.
European Community Food Aid
The EC is now second only to the United States as a
food aid donor in terms of development assistance
expenditure. It accounted for 33 per cent of transfers
from OECD countries in 1981 (Table 1), and 22 per
cent of commitments under the Food Aid Convention
(Table 2). Just over two-thirds of this food aid is
administered by the Commission as 'Community
Action' (henceforth called the 'Community pro-
gramme') and the remainder as 'national actions of
nine member states'. The programming and operation
of the Commission administered programme have
recently come under close scrutiny and have been
subject to considerable criticism in the European
Parliament and in a special report of the EC Court of
Auditors [19801. There has also been recent IDS
'For a recent exploration of these questions, see Koestler [1982], who
examines options for the EC grain economy: continuation of high
protection policies of the past, complete liberalisation, and modifi-
cations of policy to make internal markets more sensitive to world
market conditions.
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involvement in reviewing EC food aid, first in a study
of the costs and value of the resource transfer and
subsequently in an evaluation of impact on recipient
countries.
Viewed as a resource transfer, the scale of food aid is
modest in relation to both the cereal imports of
developing countries and the total development
assistance and financial flows between developed and
developing countries. In 1981 it totalled some
US$3 mn, and over 8 mn tonnes of cereals. However,
food aid has particular significance in representing a
source of quick disbursing balance of payments and
budgetary support for developing countries The
nature of the short run impact on the recipient's
domestic economy, including agriculture, depends on
the extent to which the food transfers substitute for
commercial imports or represent additional imports.
A recent literature review [Clay and Singer 1982]
concluded that currently most cereals food aid
substitutes for commercial imports, directly providing
balance of payments support, and suggesting that it
has a significant positive short run role.
Serious problems arise, however, at the overall level of
programming food aid, as has been indicated clearly
by recent shortfalls in actual shipments of cereals as
compared with commitments made by the Community
under the Food Aid Convention and original
Community allocations (Table 2). In 1981 the decision
of the Council of Ministers on Commission proposals,
and consequently implementation of the programme,
were delayed by over three months in the run up to the
French presidential election. In 1982 Commission
proposals became a political football between the
Parliament and the Council. Consequently proposals
made in February 1982 for better cereals food aid, in
addition to commitments under the Food Aid
Convention, were not approved until towards the end
of the year (and then only partially). Food aid is not a
near frictionless transfer. Commodities have to be
procured, appropriately packaged, inspected, shipping
organised arrangements which involve not only the
Commission and recipient country governments, but
also national intervention boards, traders, shippers,
port authorities etc. Such problems have made the
Community food aid programme less than effective as
a mechanism for meeting part of the food import
requirements of many developing countries.
Such problems of programming are particularly
unfortunate in the context of the increasing problems
of economic adjustment among low income countries.
A policy intervention is procyclical when it amplifies
rather than dampens cyclical fluctuations in prices and
quantities produced or consumed. Food security
interventions are normally intended to be counter
cyclical in relation to food consumption. At the very
Table 1
Food aid flows by type of official transaction of OECD countries in 1981
(US$ mn)
least, they should be neutral in impact. But food aid
has indeed proved to be procyclical, least available
when most required, in spite of the floor provided by
the 1980 Food Aid Convention. This is because the
USA, the major donor, budgets food aid in financial
rather than volume terms so that tight market
conditions result in a reduced level of food aid [Clay
and Singer 1982]. Consequently, cereals food aid
shipments fell by 6 per cent from a post world food
crisis peak in 1978/79 of 9.5 mn tonnes to only 8.9 mn
tonnes in 1980/8 1, partly because of US budgeting
procedures and partly because of the programming
problems encountered particularly by the Community.
Since then commitments and actual shipments have
been increasing once again in the softer market
conditions recently prevailing.
Approximately two-thirds ofthe Community food aid
programme is accounted for by dairy products. Dairy.
food aid mostly represents additional food imports
which do not substitute for commercial imports of the
same products. Butter oil, for example, is a costly
substitute for other vegetable-based cooking media in
countries as different as Bangladesh, Lesotho and Sri
Lanka which have all been recipients under the
Community programme. The problems of effective
and safe use of SMP have been reflected in the
food aid (net disbursements)
Source: Devetopinent Cooperation 1982 Review, OECD. Development Assistance Committee, Paris.
Note: ' Own estimate. The multilateral contributions of individual member states as reported by the DAC include national estimates of
'contributions' to the financing of EC action. Due to rounding errors there are small differences between some row and column totals.
2 Own estimate - DAC reports $26.4 mn of gross disbursements by Japan, in addition to the sub-totals for grant, loans and multi-
lateral contributions.
Other: Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland.
increasing importance assigned to high cost supply to
large numbers of small nutrition projects under the
auspices of NGOs and international agencies in many
countries. The nutritional effectiveness of direct
distribution programmes remains an area of contro-
versy [Jackson 1982]. Butter oil and SMP are also
supplied for reconstitution as milk products in dairy
development programmes. The reconstitution of dairy
products for cheese manufacture in Egypt may, of
course, be a useful form of economic transfer, but it
does not make direct impact on the problems of
hunger and food security. Evidence is wanting to
prove that these products are at all cost-effective as a
form of resource transfer.
There would appear to be possibilities for increasing
the effectiveness of Community food aid, even within
current budgetary limits, through the substitution of
more cereals for dairy products. Alternatively, a
reduction in food aid and an increase in some other
quick disbursing form of assistance, such as extending
Stabex - as discussed above, might be a more
effective channel for assistance. It is encouraging to
find opportunities at the donor end for increasing the
cost effectiveness of development assistance. If the
dairy food programme is, to a considerable extent, the
consequence of the early build-up of surpluses, then
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donor country grants loans contributions to
international
institutions
($ mn)
total donor total as
percentage of
total food aid
Australia 83.7 0.0 19.0 102.7 3.5%
Canada 70.4 6.2 86.1 162.8 5.5%
EC 'National actions' (209.7) (0.0) (73.5)' (283.2)' (9.7%)'
'Community actions' (459.6)' (0.0) (212.2)' (671.8)' (22.9%)'
Total 669.3 0.0 285.7' 955.0 32.5%
Japan 24.1 298.5 23.6 346.22 11.8%
United States 430.0 693.0 139.0 1262.0 43.0%
Other3 30.8 0.0 75.2 105.9 3.6
Total 1308.3' 997.8 628.4' 2934.52 100.0
the success of aggressive export policies may reduce
the internal Community problems of adjustments in
the commodity and commodity/financial composition
of the basket of assistance.
The relationship between food aid and food
strategies
Where there are severe problems is at the individual
country level, and in this respect food aid provides an
entry point for viewing the wider problem. At this level
there are difficult programming issues which may be
considered in the context of linkage between three
elements: EC and other bilateral commodity assistance
which has normally been programmed on an
Table 2
Cereals food aid: donor commitments under 1980 Food Aid Convention, allocations and actual shipments in 1980/81
Source: Food Aid Convention, 1980; FAO FoodAid Bulletin, no 4, 1982.
Note: Other cereals food aid, under 1971 FAC, was also shipped in 1980/81.
'Includes shipments in wheat equivalent by member nations, ('National actions') as well as 'Community actions' - in 1980/81,
928,000 tonnes were designated for 'Community actions' and 722,000 tonnes for 'National actions'.
2lncludes the grain equivalent of the budgetary allocation for fiscal year 1981 (Oct 1980-Sept 1981), as well as the estimated grain
equivalent of the supplemental allocations of US$ 142 mn for fiscal year 1980, approved by the Congress in July 1980.
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individual donor basis, with one or two recent
exceptions such as Mali and possibly Bangladesh;
other EC development assistance; and the commodity
context in a recipient economy.
This is a difficult policy area recognised explicitly by
the EC Commision [1982] in its espousal of the
concept of 'food strategies'. These proposals imply
that Community aid through different channels of
assistance, including food aid, would be organised on
a multi-year basis to support an agriculture sector
development 'strategy' directed to increasing domestic
food production. This idea runs up against a difficulty
that cannot be avoided with respect to food aid
concerning the linkages between concessional and
donor countries
commitments
under
1980 FA C
allocations
1980/81
actual
shipments
1980/81
allocations
for 1980/81
as % of FAC as
commitment
shipments
in 198 0/81
% of FAC
commitment
shipments as
%of
allocations
for 1980/81
(000 tonnes) (%)
Argentina 35 48 67 137 191 140
Australia 400 400 370 100 93 93
Austria 20 20 32 100 160 160
Canada 600 600 600 100 100 100
China - (25) 2 (8)
EEC 1,650' 1,650' 1,263' 100 77 77
Finland 20 20 29 100 145 145
India - 50 51
Japan 300 567 893 189 298 157
Norway 30 40 40 133 133 100
Saudi Arabia - (10) 31
Spain 20 20 14 100 70 70
Sweden 40 90 94 225 235 110
Switzerland 27 27 16 100 59 59
Turkey - 10 15
United States 4,470 5,2622 5,212 118 117 99
WFP purchases - (50) 13
Other - (165) 166
Total 7,612 9,054 8,908 119 111 93
commercial trade policy, and between the EC and the
programmes of other donors. The link between
commercial and concessional trade is institutionalised
in the EC Commission by the involvement of DG 6
(Agriculture) in the negotiation of the Usual
Marketing Requirement (UMR). This occurs under
the FAO rules of surplus disposal, and indicates the
level of commercial imports to be made by a food aid
recipient. The tension between aid and agricultural
trade policies makes it more difficult to provide
additional food aid to a country with a constant or
falling level of imports.
The USA, in contrast to the EEC, has always sought a
close integration of aid and agricultural policy, and as
a result the programming of food aid has provided
many examples of the difficult tension between
developmental and trade promotion objectives [Clay
and Singer 1982].
In reviewing the other linkages implied by a food
strategy, it is important to take note of the United
States' unsatisfactory experiences in attempting to
link food aid to its other bilateral assistance either by
earmarking the counterpart funds generated by food
aid sales, or by using bilateral food aid for economic
policy leverage. In the late 1970s the USA introduced
the new PL 480 Title III for programme food aid
involving multi-year priority and additional con-
cessionality. The conditions attached were that the
counterpart funds generated by the local sale of food
aid commodities should be used to support additional
agricultural developmental activity and that the
government should also make improvements in
general economic policy, particularly in relation to the
agricultural sector. The United States and many
recipient countries have found the requirements for
such agreements, including additional pressures on
managerial and monitoring capacity on both sides,
too great. In consequence only a few countries have
entered into such agreements. Another interesting
development has occurred in Bangladesh. There was
some unhappy early experience on the American side
with the attempt to apply leverage in relation to the
conditions ('self help measures') of a Title III
agreement on agricultural pricing, as well as
unsatisfactory use of counterpart funds. The United
States has now agreed that counterpart funds be used
to meet the local costs of high priority World Bank
funded rural sector projects.
The United States experience, illustrated here with
only a few examples, underscores the limitations on
individual donor action. The reality is that most food
aid recipients receive support from a range of donors,
as with other forms of assistance. Such resources are
part of the food import and food balance equations
and also provide budgetary support. The most
important 'linkage' issue for food aid is therefore the
scale, commodity composition and timing of the
different donor supplies in relation to the food system
operations of the recipient government. In the longer
run, the context of such transfers in relation to the
food, and more broadly the agricultural sector
strategy, is very important. There is, however, no
particular 'macro' food policy logic, from the recipient
country viewpoint, in emphasising linkages between
food aid and other components of assistance provided
by an individual donor, unless perhaps there is
genuine additionality in the level of aid. What makes
more sense, given the complexity of food aid
relationships, would be for a particular donor to play a
'lead agency role' in attempting to rationalise food aid
as part of a consistent multi-donor package. In
practice, because bilateral policy is more important
for food aid than for other development assistance,
this could be a role which could be played conceivably,
depending on the context, by the EC through its
Community programme, a member state, the USA, or
another donor.
The concept of a food strategy is challenging in that it
focuses attention on the problem of programming
food and other support with short run impact, which is
all too often provided in an emergency context, whilst
taking account of the longer run. The problems are
country-specific, which implies that attempts to move
in a more constructive direction would have their own
timetable. There could arise a tension, therefore,
between concern to increase the effectiveness of
assistance at the country level and the overall macro
objective of providing the largest possible scale of
adjustment assistance. This problem is again illustrated
in a United States context by the way in which food aid
has been switched rapidly towards Africa, partly in
response to the legislative requirements to target more
food aid on low income countries. The US experience
is also a warning that the EC cannot go it alone
successfully, but could play a constructive role in
facilitating positive donor group action. Third,
constructive food strategies are likely to require
additional complementary programme lending in the
short run, eg to finance fertiliser imports, as well as
capital assistance. Again, a balanced complementary
package of resources is more likely to be provided by
consortium action.
The emphasis in this article has been on areas in which
there are practical possibilities in the immediate future
for donor-end improvements in development assis-
tance. In the context of the current emphasis on
'management problems' in developing countries, it is
salutary to recognise that these possibilities for
improvement are the consequence of existing
inadequacies at the donor-end. However, many of
these problems result from the evolution of
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development assistance and trade policies in the
context of the CAP. Longer term, more coherent
policies are difficult to formulate in what is treated, at
one level, as a temporary situation, pending the reform
of the CAP. But in practice in the absence of any
evidence that there will be significant restructuring of
the CAP, particularly given the problems presented by
new entrants, development assistance policies are in
danger of being condemned to formulation in a
context that might be described as one of permanent
impermanence. That is why the current emphasis on
'food strategies' is attractive because it requires that
food aid be programmed in a longer term context,
even if it does not offer any novel and simple solution
to the tough, if not intractable, problems of food
insecurity and agricultural development.
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